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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
and exclusively on the basis of Article 767." Article 769 is some-
times cited,4" noticeably in cases which deal with servitudes which
happen to be both continuous and apparent, but it never constitutes
a determining factor. Even more important in cases in which the
servitude is discontinuous, there is little attention devoted to explain-
ing that servitudes must be continuous and apparent in order to be
established by destination; the court merely states that discontinuous
servitudes, whether apparent or not, can be established only by title.4 '
In spite of the fact that the earlier cases to the contrary have
not been expressly overruled, it seems safe to conclude that, without
much discussion of the conflict in the articles, the Louisiana courts
have finally settled on the first of the five theories of the French
commentators. The result is that our Article 769 is unnecessary and
meaningless-in all cases the servitude must be continuous and
apparent in order to be established or revived by destination.
ALVIN B. GIBSON
EFFECT OF PAYMENT OF WAGES AFTER DISABILITY
AS A CREDIT TOWARD WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION
In interpreting the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act,'
the courts have concluded that an eniployee may be totally and
permanently disabled if he cannot do work of the same character
that he was performing prior to the accident.' The fact that he may
be able to perform the same work with pain' or through assistance4
39. Taylor v. Boulware, 35 La. Ann. 469 (1888); Woodcock v. Baldwin,
51 La. Ann. 989 (1899); Capo v. ]3lanchard, 1 La. App. 3 (1924); Giarratano
v. Angermeier, 7 La. App. 375 (1927); Kelly v. Peppitone, 12 La. App. 635,
126 So. 79 (1930); Burgas v. Stoutz, 174 La. 586, 141 So. 67 (1932).
40. Taylor v. Boulware, 35 La. Ann. 469 (1883); Woodcock v. Baldwin,
51 La. Ann. 989 (1899).
41. Capo v. Blanchard, 1 La. App. 3 (1924); Giarratano v. Angermeier, 7
La. App. 315 (1927); Kelly v. Peppitone, 12 La. App. 635, 126 So. 79 (1930);
Burgas v. Stoutz, 174 La. 586, 141 So. 67 (1932).
1. La. Act 20 of 1914, as amended [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4391-44321.
2. Black v. Louisiana Central Lumber Co., 161 La. 889, 109 So. 538 (1926);
Knispel v. Gulf States Utilities Co., 174 La. 401, 141 So. 9 (1932); Stieffel v.
Valentine Sugars Co., 188 La. 1091, 179 So. 6 (1938).
3. Stieffel v. Valentine Sugars Co., 188 La. 1091, 179 So. 6 (1938); Hingle
v. Maryland Casualty Co., 30 So. (2d) 281 (La. App. 1947).
4. Norwood v. Lake Bisteneau Oil Co., 145 La. 823, 83 So. 25 (1918); Hulo
v. City of New Iberia, 153 La. 284, 95 So. 719 (1923); Carlino v. United States
Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 196 La. 400, 199 So. 228 (1940).
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or that he may be capable of performing other services at an equal
rate of pay5 does not alter the result.
After the accident the claimant may secure work with another
employer, or he may be retained by his old employer for lighter
work at the same or a slightly reduced wage. This practice of
retaining injured employees is becoming increasingly prevalent with
large industries, particularly during recent years of labor shortages.
If the claimant secures a new employer, it is clear that he does not
lose his right to full compensation merely because he is receiving
wages, for his claim depends upon the existence of disability as
determined solely by the principle set forth above.6
If, however, he is retained by the original employer, the courts
have shown themselves willing to allow the employer some credit
for wage payments made after the accident.7 Thus the amount of
compensation to be received may depend upon the identity of the
employer following the accident.
This is forcefully illustrated in the case of Gautreau v. Maryland
Casualty Company.8 The injured employee had returned to work
as a nightwatchman in the industrial plant where he sustained his
injury. Later there was a change in the plant management, which
in no way affected the worker's duties. In a subsequent suit for com-
pensation, the court held that the original employer was entitled to
a credit for the period the employee was engaged as a nightwatch-
man until the change of management, but after that time he was
working for a different employer-hence no credit would be
allowed.
5. Ranatza v. Higgins Industries, 208 La. 198, 23 So. (2d) 45 (1945);
McQueen v. Union Indemnity Co., 18 La. App. 612, 136 So. 761 (1931) ; Anderson
v. May, 195 So. 783 (La. App. 1940); Sumrall v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 1 So. (2d) 430 (La. App. 1941); Phillips v. Wohlfeld, 10 So. (2d) 258 (La.
App. 1942); Thompson v. Leach & McClain, 11 So. (2d) 109 (La. App. 1943).
6. Ibid.
7. Norwood v. Lake Bisteneau Oil Co., 145 La. 823, 83 So. 25 (1918) ; Hulo v.
City of New Iberia, 153 La. 284, 95 So. 719 (1923); Carlino v. United States
Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 196 La. 400, 199 So. 228 (1940); McKenzie v. Standard
Motor Car Co., 15 So. (2d) 115 (La. App. 1943); Thornton v. E. I. DuPont
de Nemours & Company, 207 La. 239, 21 So. (2d) 46 (1944); Holliday v. Martin
Veneer Company, 206 La. 897, 20 So. (2d) 173 (1944); Butzman v. Delta
Shipbuilding Co., 21 So. (2d) 80 (La. App. 1945); Annen v. Standard Oil Co.
of New Jersey, 28 So. (2d) 46 (La. App. 1946); D'Antoni v. Employers' Liability
Assurance Corp., 28 So. (2d) 49 (La. App. 1946); Gautreau v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 28 So. (2d) 96 (La. App. 1946); Daigle v. Higgins Industries,
29 So. (2d) 374 (La. App. 1947); Arbo v. Maryland Casualty Co., 29 So. (2d)
380 (La. App. 1947).
8. 28 So. (2d) 96 (La. App. 1946).
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At first glance the distinction drawn in the Gautreau case ap-
pears to be a tenuous one. However, the courts predicate this dis-
tinction on sound policy considerations. The purpose of the act is
to insure against the loss of earning power." The employer who
retains his injured worker effectively insures him against such loss.
This idea was best expressed in McKenzie v. Standard Motor Car
Company" as follows:
"We are of the opinion . . . that there is a difference in the
matter of allowing wages to take the place of compensation
depending on whether the injured employee continued to work
for the same employer he was working for at the time he was
injured or is working for some one else. As long as he is're-
ceiving wages from the same employer which are the equiva-
lent of or in excess of the amount of compensation he is entitled
to, he is getting that from the party who insured him against
his disability and who owes him compensation. On the other
hand, when he goes to work for some other employer, under
the same circumstances, he is receiving wages from a party who
owes him nothing in the way of compensation, as he had never
insured him against disability on the job he was injured on,
and the total amount he receives therefore bears no relation
whatever to the compensation he is entitled to recover from the
original employer ... "
Should there be a distinction between wages received as a
gratuity and wages actually earned from the original employer?
The anomaly is more pronounced if the employer is given credit
for wages which the employee fully earned at a job different from
the one he held at the time of the injury. This problem was recog-
nized in Annen v. Standard Oil Company of New Jersey :12
"It would be inequitable to charge the employer for compen-
sation in addition to the wages during the period of disability
that employee was employed; but it would also be inequitable
to consider the wages paid during such period of employment
as advanced workmen's compensation instead of wages paid for
services rendered."
9. Ibid.
10. Rylander v. T. Smith & Sons, 177 La. 716, 149 So. 434 (1933).
11. 15 So. (2d) 115, 118 (La. App. 1943).
12. 28 So. (2d) 46, 4,8 (La. App. 1946).
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The supreme court has not specifically ruled on this point since
Hulo v. City of New lberia," where it held that only the portion
which exceeded the amount actually earned would be credited on
subsequent compensation. In Carlino v. United States Fidelity and
Guaranty Company 4 and Thornton v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours
& Company, 5 the payment of equal wages for lighter work-which
presupposes that the wage was partially gratuitous-was allowed to
take the place of compensation. Holliday v. Martin Veneer Com-
pany"0 contains language to the effect that unearned wages alone
will be credited.
However, it is apparently settled insofar as the courts of appeal
are concerned that the credit applies to earned as well as unearned
wages.' 7 The rehearing of Daigle v. Higgins Industries"5 gave a
detailed discussion of this problem. The court, in reversing its prev-
ious decision, concluded that the supreme court decisions lead to
the view that earned as well as unearned wages should be credited.
Further, it would do violence to the spirit of the act to allow an
injured employee to collect both wages and compensation from the
same employer for the same period.
How much credit should be allowed? Two appellate cases'"
went so far as to hold that the employer would be credited with
the entire wage received by the employee, though it exceeded the
maximum compensation allowable. In the Hulo case"0 the supreme
court ruled that when the employer paid the employee more than
he actually earned, the excess payments should be taken into ac-
count as advance payments on compensation due. Thus, if the court
should decide that twenty dollars represented the earned and thirty
dollars the unearned portion of a weekly pay check of fifty dollars,
the thirty dollars would be credited toward future compensation.
13. 153 La. 284, 95 So. 719 (1928).
14. 196 La. 400, 199 So. 228 (1940).
15. 207 La. 239, 21 So. (2d) 46 (1944).
16. 206 La. 897, 20 So. (2d) 173 (1944).
17. McKenzie v. Standard Motor Car Co., 15 So. (2d) 115 (La. App. 1943);
Butzman v. Delta Shipbuilding Co., 21 So. (2d) 80 (La. App. 1945); Annen v.
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 28 So. (2d) 46 (La. App. 1946); D'Antoni v.
Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 28 So. (2d) 49 (La. App. 1946); Gautreau
v. Maryland Casualty Co., 28 So. (2d) 96 (La. App. 1946); Daigle v. Higgins
Industries, 29 So. (2d) 374 (La. App. 1947); Arbo v. Maryland Casualty Co.,
29 So. (2d) 380 (La. App. 1947).
18. Supra note 17.
19. Becton v. Deas Paving Co., 3 La. App. 683 (1926); Hennen v. Highway
Commission, 178 So. 654 (La. App. 1938).
20. Supra note 4.
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A modification of this rule was made in the Carlino case,2
where it was stated that the employee would not be entitled to com-
pensation for a period during which he received wages equal to
or exceeding maximum compensation allowable. The basis for the
decision was that no right or cause of action existed during that
period. The court went on to say:
"But we see no reason why the insurer should have credit for
excess payments made by the employer to an injured employee
as a gratuity. The payments made in such a case in the form
of wages, merely take the place of compensation due to the
injured employee for the period in which the payments were
made."
The effect of the Carlino decision was to allow the employer
a maximum credit at the rate of twenty dollars per week for the
period during which the employee received wages equal to or ex-
ceeding maximum allowable compensation. The same result has
been reached in a variety of ways. In the Thornton case22 the court
indicated that the employee suffered no loss or diminution of earn-
ing power when his wages were paid in full.23 Other cases have
reached this conclusion by stating that compensation is suspended
for that period,24 that the payment of wages constitute compensa-
tion to the extent of twenty dollars per week,25 or simply that com-
pensation is not collectible for the period during which the employee
received from his original employer wages equal to or exceeding
the maximum allowable compensation.2"
It is desirable to encourage the employer to rehabilitate his in-
jured employee. This practice would serve a two-fold purpose: it
would give the employee a sense of security and would tend to
reduce employee-employer litigation. Both of these factors lead
toward tranquillity on the industrial scene.27
21. Ibid.
22. 196 La. 400, 199 So. 228 (1940).
23. See Ulmer v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 190 So. 175 (La.
App. 1939).
24. Butzman v. Delta Shipbuilding Co., 21 So. (2d) 80 (La. App. 1945).
25. Vega. v. Higgins Industries, Inc., 23 So. (2d) 661 (La. App. 1944).
26. Hingle v. Maryland Casualty Co., 80 So. (2d) 281 (La. App. 1947).
27. Under Section 81 of the act [Dart's Stats. (1939) §4420], the employee
is given one year to bring his action. Payment of compensation will interrupt
this prescriptive period. See Comment (1948) 8 LouISIANA LAW REVIEW 397.
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The foregoing discussion applies only where compensation is
sought,for general disability.28 Whenever the action is for a specific
injury, no credit will be given the employer for wages paid after
the injury. 9
THOMAS A. DuRHAm
UNITED STATES SAVINGS BONDS-OWNERSHIP
AND STATE INHERITANCE TAXES
With a substantial portion of the nation's individual wealth
held in the form of United States Savings Bonds, the questions of
ownership and of ,taxability of these bonds have arisen in numerous
successions.
The treasury department has authorized savings bonds to be
registered in any one of three forms. They may be registered in the
name of a single owner, as "John A. Jones"; or in the name of two
persons as coowners, as "John A. Jones or Mrs. Ella S. Jones"; or
in the name of two persons, one of whom is beneficiary of the other,
as "John A. Jones, payable on death to Mrs. Mary E. Jones."' The
single ownership form presents no problem. When the registered
owner dies, the bonds obviously are a part of his estate and are
subject to inheritance taxes. Virtually all the litigation on the sub-
ject has centered around the coownership and the beneficiary forms
of registration.
The matter of actual ownership of the bonds upon the death of
one coowner or of the registered owner seems to have been definitely
settled. In the Succession of Land' the bonds were registered in the
names of the decedent and another as coowners. The court held that
the surviving coowner became absolute owner under the regulations
governing United States War Savings Bonds' subject, however, to
28. La. Act 20 of 1914, § 8(1)(A)-(c) as amended [Dart's Stats. (1989)
§ 4398(1)(a)-(c)] provides the schedule of payments for temporary total,
permanent total, and partial disability.
29. Subsection 1(d) of Section 8 of the act [Dart's Stats. (1939) §
4398(1)(d)] provides the schedule of payments for various specific injuries.
In such cases the compensation is more in the nature of damages than disability
payments. See Fulmer v. McDade Gin Co., 142 So. 733 (La. App. 1932); Smith
v. Turner Lumber Co., 174 So. 699 (La. App. 1937).
1. Treasury Department Circular No. 530, Sixth Revision, 10 Fed. Reg.
1956 (1945).
2. 212 La. 103, 31 So. (2d) 609 (1947).
3. Treasury Department Circular No. 530, Sixth Revision, 10 Fed. Reg.
1956 (1945).
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